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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-2012
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JACKIE HOLDER, etc., et al., PETITIONERS v.
E. K. HALL, Sr., et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the eleventh circuit
[June 30, 1994]

  Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the
Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief
Justice joined, and in all but Part II-B of which
Justice O'Connor joined.
  This case presents the question whether the size of a
governing authority is subject to a vote dilution chal-
lenge under 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
U. S. C. 1973.

                            I
  The State of Georgia has 159 counties, one of which
is Bleckley County, a rural county in central Georgia.
Black persons make up nearly 20% of the eligible voting
population in Bleckley County.  Since its creation in
1912, the county has had a single-commissioner form of
government for the exercise of -county governing
authority.-  See Ga. Code Ann. 1-3-3(7) (Supp. 1993).
Under this system, the Bleckley County Commissioner
performs all of the executive and legislative functions of
the county government, including the levying of general
and special taxes, the directing and controlling of all
county property, and the settling of all claims.  Ga.
Code. Ann. 36-5-22.1 (1993).  In addition to Bleckley
County, about 10 other Georgia counties use the single-
commissioner system; the rest have multimember
commissions.
  In 1985, the Georgia Legislature authorized Bleckley
County to adopt a multimember commission consisting
of five commissioners elected from single-member
districts and a single chairman elected at large.  1985
Ga. Laws, p. 4406.  In a referendum held in 1986,
however, the electorate did not adopt the change to a
multimember commission.  (In a similar referendum four
years earlier, county voters had approved a five-member
district plan for the election of the county school board.)
  In 1985, respondents (six black registered voters from
Bleckley County and the Cochran/Bleckley County
Chapter of the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People) challenged the single-commissioner
system in a suit filed against petitioners (Jackie Holder,
the incumbent county commissioner, and Probate Judge
Robert Johnson, the superintendent of elections).  The
complaint raised both a constitutional and a statutory
claim.
  In their constitutional claim, respondents alleged that
the county's single-member commission was enacted or
maintained with an intent to exclude or to limit the
political influence of the county's black community in
violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
At the outset, the District Court made extensive findings
of fact about the political history and dynamics of
Bleckley County.  The court found, for example, that
when the county was formed in 1912, few if any black
citizens could vote.  Indeed, until passage of federal civil
rights laws, Bleckley County -enforced racial segregation
in all aspects of local government-courthouse, jails,
public housing, governmental services-and deprived its
black citizens of the opportunity to participate in local
government.-  757 F. Supp. 1560, 1562 (MD Ga. 1991).
And even today, though legal segregation no longer
exists, -more black than white residents of Bleckley
County continue to endure a depressed socio-economic
status.-  Ibid.  No black person has run for or been
elected to the office of Bleckley County Commissioner,
and the District Judge stated that, having run for public
office himself, he -wouldn't run if [he] were black in
Bleckley County.-  See 955 F. 2d 1563, 1571 (CA11
1992).
  The court rejected respondents' constitutional conten-
tion, however, concluding that respondents -ha[d] failed
to provide any evidence that Bleckley County's single
member county commission [wa]s the product of original
or continued racial animus or discriminatory intent.-
757 F. Supp., at 1571.  Nor was there evidence that the
system was maintained -for tenuous reasons- or that the
commissioner himself was unresponsive to the -particu-
larized needs- of the black community.  Id., at 1564.
There was no -slating process- to stand as a barrier to
black candidates, and there was testimony from respond-
ents that they were unaware of any racial appeals in
recent elections.  Id., at 1562, n. 2, 1583.
  In their statutory claim, respondents asserted that the
county's single-member commission violated 2 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42
U. S. C. 1973.  Under the statute, the suit contended,
Bleckley County must have a county commission of
sufficient size that, with single-member election districts,
the county's black citizens would constitute a majority in
one of the single-member districts.  Applying the 2
framework established in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U. S. 30 (1986), the District Court found that respond-
ents satisfied the first of the three Gingles preconditions
because black voters were sufficiently numerous and
compact that they could have constituted a majority in
one district of a multimember commission.  In particu-
lar, the District Court found that -[i]f the county
commission were increased in number to six commission-
ers to be elected from five single member districts and
if the districts were the same as the present school
board election districts, a black majority `safe' district
. . . would result.-  757 F. Supp., at 1565.  The court
found, however, that respondents failed to satisfy the
second and third Gingles preconditions-that whites vote
as a bloc in a manner sufficient to defeat the black-
preferred candidate and that blacks were politically
cohesive.
  The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed
on the statutory claim.  Relying on its decision in
Carrollton Branch of NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F. 2d
1547 (CA11 1987), the court first held that a challenge
to the single-commissioner system was subject to the
same analysis as that used in Gingles.  Applying that
analysis, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District
Court that respondents had satisfied the first Gingles
precondition by showing that blacks could constitute a
majority of the electorate in one of five single-member
districts.  The court explained that it was -appropriate
to consider the size and geographical compactness of the
minority group within a restructured form of the
challenged system when the existing structure is being
challenged as dilutive.-  955 F. 2d, at 1569.  The Court
of Appeals further found that the District Court had
erred in concluding that the second and third Gingles
preconditions were not met.  Turning to the totality of
the circumstances, the court found that those circum-
stances supported a finding of liability under 2.  The
court therefore concluded that respondents had proved
a violation of 2, and it remanded for formulation of a
remedy, which, it suggested, -could well be modeled-
after the system used to elect the Bleckley County
school board.  Id., at 1573-1574, and n. 20.  Because of
its statutory ruling, the Court of Appeals did not
consider the District Court's ruling on respondents'
constitutional claim.
  We granted certiorari to review the statutory holding
of the Court of Appeals.  507 U. S. ___ (1993).

                           II

                            A
  Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides
that -[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting,
or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or
applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
race or color.-  42 U. S. C. 1973(a).  In a 2 vote
dilution suit, along with determining whether the
Gingles preconditions are met and whether the totality
of the circumstances supports a finding of liability, a
court must find a reasonable alternative practice as a
benchmark against which to measure the existing voting
practice.  See post, at 3 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment).  As Justice
O'Connor explained in Gingles: -The phrase vote
dilution itself suggests a norm with respect to which the
fact of dilution may be ascertained . . . . [I]n order to
decide whether an electoral system has made it harder
for minority voters to elect the candidates they prefer,
a court must have an idea in mind of how hard it
should be for minority voters to elect their preferred
candidates under an acceptable system.-  478 U. S., at
88 (opinion concurring in judgment) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
  In certain cases, the benchmark for comparison in a
2 dilution suit is obvious.  The effect of an anti-single-
shot voting rule, for instance, can be evaluated by
comparing the system with that rule to the system
without that rule.  But where there is no objective and
workable standard for choosing a reasonable benchmark
by which to evaluate a challenged voting practice, it
follows that the voting practice cannot be challenged as
dilutive under 2.  See post, at 3-7 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
  As the facts of this case well illustrate, the search for
a benchmark is quite problematic when a 2 dilution
challenge is brought to the size of a government body.
There is no principled reason why one size should be
picked over another as the benchmark for comparison.
Respondents here argue that we should compare
Bleckley County's sole commissioner system to a hypo-
thetical five-member commission in order to determine
whether the current system is dilutive.  Respondents
and the United States as amicus curiae give three
reasons why the single commissioner structure should be
compared to a five-member commission (instead of, say,
a 3-, 10-, or 15-member body): (1) because the
five-member commission is a common form of governing
authority in the State; (2) because the state legislature
had authorized Bleckley County to adopt a five-member
commission if it so chose (it did not); and (3) because
the county had moved from a single superintendent of
education to a school board with five members elected
from single-member districts.  See Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 17-18.
  These referents do not bear upon dilution.  It does not
matter, for instance, how popular the single-member
commission system is in Georgia in determining whether
it dilutes the vote of a minority racial group in Bleckley
County.  That the single-member commission is uncom-
mon in the State of Georgia, or that a five-member
commission is quite common, tells us nothing about its
effects on a minority group's voting strength.  The sole
commissioner system has the same impact regardless of
whether it is shared by none, or by all, of the other
counties in Georgia.  It makes little sense to say (as do
respondents and the United States) that the sole
commissioner system should be subject to a dilution
challenge if it is rare-but immune if it is common.
  That Bleckley County was authorized by the State to
expand its commission, and that it adopted a five-
member school board, are likewise irrelevant consider-
ations in the dilution inquiry.  At most, those facts
indicate that Bleckley County could change the size of
its commission with minimal disruption.  But the
county's failure to do so says nothing about the effects
the sole commissioner system has on the voting power
of Bleckley County's citizens.  Surely a minority group's
voting strength would be no more or less diluted had the
State not authorized the county to alter the size of its
commission, or had the county not enlarged its school
board.  One gets the sense that respondents and the
United States have chosen a benchmark for the sake of
having a benchmark.  But it is one thing to say that a
benchmark can be found, quite another to give a
convincing reason for finding it in the first place.

                            B
  To bolster their argument, respondents point out that
our 5 cases may be interpreted to indicate that covered
jurisdictions may not change the size of their
government bodies without obtaining preclearance from
the Attorney General or the federal courts.  Brief for
Respondents 29; see Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n,
502 U. S. ___, ___-___ (1992) (slip op., at 9-10); Lockhart
v. United States, 460 U. S. 125, 131-132 (1983); City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 161 (1980).
Respondents contend that these 5 cases, together with
the similarity in language between 2 and 5 of the Act,
compel the conclusion that the size of a government
body must be subject to a dilution challenge under 2.
It is true that in Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U. S. 380,
401-402 (1991), we said that the coverage of 2 and 5
is presumed to be the same (at least if differential cover-
age would be anomalous).  We did not adopt a conclu-
sive rule to that effect, however, and we do not think
that the fact that a change in a voting practice must be
precleared under 5 necessarily means that the voting
practice is subject to challenge in a dilution suit under
2.
  To be sure, if the structure and purpose of 2 mir-
rored that of 5, then the case for interpreting 2 and
5 to have the same application in all cases would be
convincing.  But the two sections differ in structure,
purpose, and application.  Section 5 applies only in
certain jurisdictions specified by Congress and -only to
proposed changes in voting procedures.-  Beer v. United
States, 425 U. S. 130, 138 (1976); see 42 U. S. C.
1973b(b) (specifying jurisdictions where 5 applies).  In
those covered jurisdictions, a proposed change in a
voting practice must be approved in advance by the
Attorney General or the federal courts.  1973c.  The
purpose of this requirement -has always been to insure
that no voting-procedure changes would be made that
would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial
minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise.-  425 U. S., at 141.  Under 5, then,
the proposed voting practice is measured against the
existing voting practice to determine whether retrogres-
sion would result from the proposed change.  See id., at
141.  The baseline for comparison is present by defini-
tion; it is the existing status.  While there may be
difficulty in determining whether a proposed change
would cause retrogression, there is little difficulty in
discerning the two voting practices to compare to
determine whether retrogression would occur.  See 28
CFR 51.54(b) (1993).
  Retrogression is not the inquiry in 2 dilution cases.
42 U. S. C. 1973(a) (whether voting practice -results in
a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color-); S.
Rep. No. 97-417, p. 68, n. 224 (1982) (-Plaintiffs could
not establish a Section 2 violation merely by showing
that a challenged reapportionment or annexation, for
example, involved a retrogressive effect on the political
strength of a minority group-).  Unlike in 5 cases,
therefore, a benchmark does not exist by definition in 2
dilution cases.  And as explained above, with some
voting practices, there in fact may be no appropriate
benchmark to determine if an existing voting practice is
dilutive under 2.  For that reason, a voting practice
that is subject to the preclearance requirements of 5 is
not necessarily subject to a dilution challenge under 2.
  This conclusion is quite unremarkable.  For example,
in Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 388 (1971), we
held that a town's annexation of land was covered under
5.  Notwithstanding that holding, we think it quite
improbable to suggest that a 2 dilution challenge could
be brought to a town's existing political boundaries (in
an attempt to force it to annex surrounding land) by
arguing that the current boundaries dilute a racial
group's voting strength in comparison to the proposed
new boundaries.  Likewise, in McCain v. Lybrand, 465
U. S. 236 (1984), we indicated that a change from an
appointive to an elected office was covered under 5.
Here, again, we doubt Congress contemplated that a
racial group could bring a 2 dilution challenge to an
appointive office (in an attempt to force a change to an
elective office) by arguing that the appointive office
diluted its voting strength in comparison to the proposed
elective office.  We think these examples serve to show
that a voting practice is not necessarily subject to a
dilution challenge under 2 even when a change in that
voting practice would be subject to the preclearance
requirements of 5.

                           III
  With respect to challenges to the size of a governing
authority, respondents fail to explain where the search
for reasonable alternative benchmarks should begin and
end, and they provide no acceptable principles for
deciding future cases.  The wide range of possibilities
makes the choice -inherently standardless,- post, at 5
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment), and we therefore conclude that a plaintiff
cannot maintain a 2 challenge to the size of a govern-
ment body, such as the Bleckley County Commission.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for consideration of respondents'
constitutional claim.
                       It is so ordered.